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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
SPENCER VAN NOY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Case No. 8627 
-vs-
RICHARD GIBBS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Spencer Van Noy 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and Respondent Spencer Van Noy will be 
hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff and Defendant and Appel-
lant Richard Worthen Gibbs will be hereinafter referr·ed to 
as Defendant. 
November 18, 1954, Plaintiff Spencer Van Noy and De-
fendant, Richard Worthen Gibbs, and certain other persons 
executed articles of incorporation for a Uta!h corporation called 
Valley Amusement Enterprises Incorporated. (R 89-96). Plain-
tiff and Defendant each subscribed for stock in the ~corpora­
tion in an identical amount - 1950 shares. (R.,~89). Each appears 
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in the articles of incorporation as an officer and as a member 
of the Board of Directors. (R-92). The shares of plaintiff and 
the defendant were fully paid. The Plaintiff and Defendant 
each attested to that fact. (R-96). No ·stock •certificates were 
issued at the time of incorporation. (R-61). 
A few weeks after the corporation was organized internal 
difficulties arose among the incorporators. (R-12, 13). At one 
time or another the plaintiff and the defendant ·exchanged 
words and each offered to buy the other out. (R-12, 13, 44, 67). 
Thereafter a Mr. McDermond, (Referred to as McDermaid in 
the transcript) one of the incorporators, negotiated with plain-
tiff on behalf of defendant Gibbs for the purchase by Gibbs 
of plaintiff's interest in Valley Amusement Enterprises Incor-
porated. (R-12, 35). Defendant Gibbs knew what the corporate 
interest of plaintiff was. (R-14, 26). Sometime prior to January 
24, 1955, an instrument (Exhibit 1) was prepared by Mr. 
McDermond and the sister of the defendant Gibbs. (R-71). 
January 24, 1955, exhibit 1 was presented to plaintiff by Mr. 
McDermond acting for defendant Gibbs. (R-'12). 
The instrument states: 
ASSIGNMENT 
"For and in consideration of the sum of $2,000.00 
payable $750.00 down, receipt of which is hereby ac-
knowledged, and the balance of $1,200.00 payable with-
in ninety (90) days from date, I hereby sell, transfer 
and assign all my right, title and interest to the shares 
of Capital Stock in the Valley Amusement Enterprises, 
Inc., and do hereby appoint Richard Gibbs owner with 
full power of substitution in the premises." 
Dated this 24th day of January, 1955." 
I sl Spencer Van Noy 
Witness 
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"A note payable and replacing this release will be 
issued with other legal papers within (5) five days from 
date above." 
Is/ Spencer Van Noy 
Exhibit 1 was then executed by plaintiff and he was then 
given a check by McDermond in the sum of $750.00 as is re-
cited in the instrument. (R-39). A copy of exhibit 1 was returned 
to McDermond and was subsequently delivered to Dr. 
Gibbs who «accepted" or ratified the deal. (R-73). Plaintiff 
then ceased participating in the activities of the corporation. 
Dr. Gibbs carried on the activities of the corporation. About 
April 24, 1955, plaintiff made demand upon defendant for 
payment of the remaining amount due to him under exhib-
it 1. (R-39, 20). Defendant indicated that he did not have 
the money; that he fully intended to pay it; that plaintiff 
should call him back in a week or so. (R-20, 39-40). During the 
time when demand was made defendant at no time denied 
owing the sum sought .(R-40). Defendant testified that he 
discovered there was no written lease on the premises at 3793 
South State Street. (R-30). Defendant finally refused to make 
payment on the amount due to plaintiff and plaintiff then filed 
action July 13, 1955 to collect the amount due. (R-1, 2). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
A STOCKHOLDER MAY SELL OR ASSIGN HIS IN-
TEREST IN A CORPORATION WITHOUT THE FORMAL 
EXECUTION AND TENDER OF A SHARE CERTIFICATE. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT IS PRECLUDED FROM ASSERTING 
THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A SO-CALLED LEASEHOLD 
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AT 3793 SOUTH STATE STREET IN SALT LAKE COUN-
TY; THERE WAS NO MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT AS 
TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE SO-CALLED LEASEHOLD 
AND EVEN IF THERE WERE A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF 
FACT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE LEASEHOLD 
IT IS NOT MATERIAL BECAUSE THE LEASEHOLD WAS 
NOT THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE BARGAIN BE-
TWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT. 
POINT III. 
THERE WAS NO FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION 
AND DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RESTITU-
TION OF THE AMOUNT ORIGINALLY PAID OVER TO 
PLAINTIFF. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A STOCKHOLDER MAY SELL OR ASSIGN HIS IN-
TEREST IN A CORPORATION WITHOUT THE FORMAL 
EXECUTION AND TENDER OF A SHARE CERTIFICATE. 
Though no certificates were issued evidencing their inter-
est, both plaintiff and def,endant were stockholders in Valley 
Amusement Enterprises Incorporated. Each originally sub-
scribed and paid for 1950 shares. (R-89, 96). Each owned 
stock in the corporation, though apparently neither had a 
certificate evidencing such stock ownership. (R-61). A stock-
holder is one who owns stock in a corporation. (See Fletcher 
Cyclopedia Corporations Vol. 11, Page 65, paragraph 5094). 
A certificate of stock is not the ~stock itseH. It is merely 
written evidence of the ownership thereof and of the rights 
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and liabilities resulting from such ownership. It is merely 
the paper representative of incorporeal rights and stands on 
a footing similar to other muniments of title. (See 18 C.J.S. 
721, paragraph 258). 
l·ssuance of a certificate is not necessary to make one a 
stockholder. The fact :that plaintiff did not have physical 
possession of a certificate «in no manner affects his owner-
ship of ,the stock." See Robey vs. Hardy, 63 Utah 231, 224 
P. 889 at 892, also Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations Volume 
11, Page 60, Paragraph 5092. 
As is pointed 'Out in the factual narrative, because of in-
ternal difficulties in corporate affairs, plaintiff and defendant 
exchanged words and each offered to buy the other out. 
Thereafter an agent of defendant Gibbs negotiated with plain-
tiff for the sale to Gibbs of plaintiff's interest in the Valley 
Amusement Enterprises Incorporated. Gibbs knew what the 
corporate interest of plaintiff was. (R-14, 21). Exhibit 1 was 
prepared by McDermond, an agent of Gibbs, and by the 
sister of Gibbs, and was presented to plaintiff for execution. 
The language is the language of those acting for and on behalf 
of Gibbs, Plaintiff executed the instrument and was then given 
a check for $750.00 as part payment for his interest. 
The intent of the parties is clearly and plainly expressed 
by the instrument, Exhibit 1. (R-87). It is dear that plaintiff 
sold . and defendant purchased plaintiff's interest in Valley 
Amusement Enterprises Incorporated as of January 24, 19155. 
The language used is used in the present tense. The instru-
ment states in part, " ... I hereby sell, transfer and assign ... , 
and do hereby appoint Richard Gibbs owner .... " Exhibit 
1 is the instrument of sale, transf.~r and assignment. This 
is obvious from the use of the words "sell, 'transfer and assign," 
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the use of the term ·'hereby" as well as the use of the word 
"owner." Gibbs is not called the purchaser but is called 
"owner." Defendant, in Paragraph 3 of his answer, admits 
as much. (R-3). The subject matter of the sale, transfer and 
assignment, namely that which plaintiff had and that of which 
Gibbs became "owner" is clearly spelled out in the instrument 
as all of plaintiff's " ... right, title and interest to the shares 
of capital stock in the Valley Amusement Enterprises Inc .... " 
Some months after the transfer to Gibbs of plaintiffs 
interest in Valley Amusement Enterprizes Incorporated, de-
fendant Gibbs decided that he did not want to pay for what 
he had purchased and now claims that the instrument drawn 
by his agent and his sister, which he had "accepted" (R-72) 
does not meet the technical requirements of the law. 
Defendant erroneously asserts that the Uniform Stock trans-
fer act is applicable to this fact situation and erroneously as-
serts that 16-3-1 Uta:h Code Annotated 1953 provides the exclu-
sive manner for the transfer of shares of stock in a corp>mtion. 
16-3-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 states in part: 
.. Title to a certificate and to the shares represented 
thereby ... 
16-3-10 Utah Code Annotated 1953 states in part: 
"An attempted transfer of title to a certificate or 
to the shares represented thereby ... " 
16·3-21 Utah Code Annotated 1953 states in part: 
" 'Title' means legal title and does not include a 
merely equitable or beneficial ownership or interest." 
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16-3-21 Utah Code Annotated 1953 states in part: 
" ... The provisions of this chapter apply to cer-
tificates heretofore issued or hereafter to be issued . . ." 
The uniform stock transfer act assumes the existence of 
a certificate representing shares in a corporation. The act 
was designed to give such certificates certain attributes of 
negotiability. Each of the provisions referred to by the de-
fendant is applicable only where there is a certificate in ex-
istence. In this instance there is no such certificate because 
a certificate was never issued. Certainly the uniform stock 
transfer act does not say that all corporations must issue cer-
tificates. It merely says that if certificates are issued which 
represent shares in a corporation then centain formalities must 
be complied with in transferring those certificates or the shares 
represented thereby. Clearly it does not prohibit a stockholder 
in a corporation which has not issued certificates from selling, 
transferring or assigning his interest in that corporation in a 
manner other than by certificate transfer. 
The case of Markis vs. Melis, 50 Utah 544, 167 P. 802-04, 
relied on by defendant is clearly distinguishable from the instant 
fact situation. That case was decided prior to the enactment 
of the unifonn stock transfer act and construed a portion of 
the transfer law then in effect. The statute therein construed 
has been somewhat modified and is now s·et forth at 16-2-34 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. The court in that case held that 
under Title 14 C. L. Utah 1907 at 330 a purchaser of stock was 
entitled to a stock certificate when such a certificate had been 
issued, was in existence and in the possession of the seller. 
In the instant case no stock certificate was ever is·sued. There 
is nothing in 16-2-34 which prohibits the transfer or assign-
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ment of a stock interest in a corporation in the manner used 
in the present case. 
Under the terms of Exhibit 1, defendant was the "owner" 
and was granted "full power of substitution in the premises." 
If he desired a certificate he could compel the corporation to 
issue 1him one. 
The case of Rock vs. Gustavson Oil Co., 204 P. 96 cited by 
the defendant is distinguishable from the case before the 
court. The instant case is not one of the '~ordinary" cases the 
court there is talking about. In that case plaintiff acquired 
from a defendant corporation, an option to purchase certain 
stock, said option to be exercised within ten days after the 
happening of a condition, namely the discovery of oil at a cer-
tain drilling site. The purchaser exercised the option, made 
payment to the corporation for 50,000 shares of stock, the 
defendant to deliver the certificates within a reasonable length 
of time, the purchaser and the defendant corporation each 
being aware that the stock was being acquired for purposes 
of "resale." The stock certificates were not delivered within 
a reasonable time and 1the public market price of the stock 
went down. Plaintiff claims he was damaged because of the 
inability to deliver certificates to his purchasers at the high 
market price. No efforts were made in· any fashion to transfer 
the shares. 
Plaintiff in the instant case was an individual stockholder 
to whom a certificate had not been issued by the corporation; 
defendant was aware no certificate had been issued; defendant 
was not acquiring the corporate interest of plaintiff for "resale" 
to the public; plaintiff transferred to defendant by written in-
strument prepared by defendant's agent and defendant's sister 
all his right, title and interest to shares in Valley Amusement 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Enterprises Incorporated; plaintiff's duties were all performed 
under the 'COntract, the only executory duty remaining being 
that of the defendant to pay the amount due; defendant has 
at no time made demand upon plaintiff for the delivery to 
him of a stock certificate. 
We submit that plaintiff performed all he was duty bound 
to perform under Exhibit 1 and that defendant is duty bound 
to pay :the remaining about due under the instrument. We 
feel that in the light of 1the argument outlined above that the 
court incorrectly ordered that a stock cerificate be delivered 
to defendant by plaintiff and that that portion of his judgment 
was in error and should be modified and that plaintiffs judg-
ment for $1350.00, interest and costs should be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT IN PRECLUDED FROM ASSERTING 
THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A SO-CALLED LEASEHOLD 
AT 3793 SOUTH STATE STREET; THERE WAS NO MU-
TUAL MISTAKE OF FACT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF 
THE SO-CALLED LEASEHILD AND EVEN IF THERE 
WERE A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT AS TO THE EX-
ISTENCE OF THE LEASEHOLD IT IS NOT MATERIAL 
BECAUSE THE LEASEHOLD WAS NOT THE SUBJECT 
MATTER OF THE BARGAIN BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND 
DEFENDANT. 
There is recited in the articles of incorporattion that a 
lease was transferred to the corporation by a Mr. McDermond 
in return for shares in the corporation. Both plaintiff and 
defendant were apparently swtisfied that such a lease existed 
because each attested to the fact that the leasehold given to 
the corporation was reasonably wo.l'lth the amount allowed by 
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the corporation and each attested as of their own knowledge 
that the capital stock subscribed f.or by each of the incorpor-
ators including that subscribed for by Mr. McDermond was 
paid for. (R-95, 96).) 
Defendant tes·tified that the leasehold does not in fact exis.t; 
that he learned of this fact sometime after January 24 rthough 
the record i·s somewhat confused as to the exact time when 
this purportedly was learned by defendant; that a Mr. Hong 
returned to the leasehold and occupied a part thereof in April 
of 1955; that the leasehold was not on the whole building 
but just on the back end. (R-21, 22); that he went to see the 
property owner sometime in May after a demand had been 
made for more rent. (R-22); that the Club opened in June 
(R-19); :that the Club ran during the 90 day period. (R-24). 
The record is in a state of confusion as to just when de-
fendant learned there was no lease on the premises occupied 
by Valley Amusement. There is some confusion as to whether 
the so-called lease was on the whole premises at 3793 South 
State Street or merely on the back portion of the premises. 
It appears to be clear, however, that he learned of the faot 
at least one and one-half to two months prior to the time 
plaintiff filed his lawsuit and :that during that time defendant 
attempted to negotiate a written lease with the landlord and 
that the corporate activities were carried on at the building 
during this period. (R-30). 
Plaintiff asserts that defendant is now precluded from 
denying the existence of a lease that defendant had previously 
acknowledged existed when he attested as to its value; that 
he is precluded from avering the non-existence of a lease 
which, through his acts and deeds he maintained existed at 
the time of corporate organization. As a matter of policy, 
10 
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the law should not now allow :this defendant to aver the non-
existence of a lease he solemnly and under oath proclaimed 
existed. (R-95, 96). 
The articles of incorporation recite that Mr. M·cDermond 
transferred the lease 1to the corporation. If, as defendant 
claims, there was in fact, no lease than one may reasonably 
infer that Mr. McDermond knew there was no lease. McDer-
mond represented defendant Gibbs in acquiring for Gibbs 
plaintiff's interest in Valley Amusemerrt Enterprises Inc. If 
defendant's agent, McDermond knew there was no lease, then 
such knowledge is attributable to his principal Gibbs, and 
Gibbs cannot now complain he was laboring under a mistake 
of fact. The general rule is stated at 2 AM. Jur. 294, Para-
graph 376, as follows: 
"According to the majority view which i·s based 
upon the theory of a presumption that that agent per-
forms :the duties of his agency by disclosing 1to the 
principal any knowledge which he may possess neces-
sary or material to the protection of the principal's 
interests, the fact that the knowledge wHh which the 
principal is sought to be charged was acquired by 
his agent prior to ·his agency does not prevent the ap-
plication of the general rule charging the principal with 
the knowledge ·of his agent." 
A review of the whole record, the nature of defendant's 
testimony, the usual confusion of his testimony as to his relation 
with M·cDermond and his understanding in relation to the lease 
·support the assertion that not only did his agent, McDermond, 
know of the status of the lease but tha1t the defendant himself 
knew. 
Defendant argues as if he were purchasing a leasehold from 
plaintiff rather than an interest in a corporation. Defendant 
11 
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himself 1testified (R-15) that no conversations were had con-
cerning a lease when discus·sing their bargain. Defendant's 
testimony shows that internal corporate difficulties prompted 
his purchase of plaintiffs interest. The record is barren of any 
evidence that defendant would have acquired control of the 
corporation ·even with the purchase of plaintiff's interest so as 
to control the leasehold if one existed. Defendant himself 
testified 1that there were assets other than the leasehold at the 
time of his purchase of plaintiffs interest. (R-75). Defendant 
acquired plaintiffs interest in whatever there was. Defendant 
testified he knew what plaintiffs interest was. (R-14). 
POINT III. 
THERE WAS NO FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION AND 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RESTITUTION OF 
THE AMOUNT PAID OVER TO PLAINTIFF. 
Defendant does not allege lack of consideration to support 
the agreement between plaintiff and defendant. He asserts a 
failure of consideration because of the alleged non-existence 
of a lease which he apparently hoped was part of the assets 
of :the corporation and which he alleges makes the corporate 
shares transferred to the defendant by plaintiff witthout value. 
As of January 24, 1955, plaintiff conveyed to defendant 
all of his "right, title and interest to tthe shares of capital stock 
in Valley Amusement Eenterprises Inc. . . ." The conveyance 
was complete as of ·that date. Defendant testified that the cor-
poration had assets other than the so-called leasehold as of that 
date. (R-75). 
Defendant acquired each and every right of plaintiff as a 
stockholder in the •corporation. It is basic that the frustration 
of an expectation or anticipation of the purchaser does not 
12 
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amount to a failure of consideration. He cannot escape liability 
for the purchase price merely because the venture turned out 
badly or as not as profitable as he expected it to be. (See Fletcher 
Cyclopedia Corporations Volume 12a, Page 26, Paragraph 5574). 
The facts in this instance do not justify recission or resti-
tution in favor of defendant. Defendant made no timely effort 
to rescind afiter his so-called discovery of the non-existence of 
a lease. He attempted t'O negotiate a lease and in fact carried 
on his activities rf.n make the corporation an operating company. 
Only rut the time when 'his rightful obligation to pay was being 
pressed did he then, through ·his ·counsel, make demand for the 
return of his money and even then he failed to tender back all 
that had been ·Conveyed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted :that the trial court's judgment was ·correct 
in substance, that plaintiff's judgment for $1'250, interest and costs 
should be affirmed and thrut defendant is entitled to neither 
reversal nor judgment on his counterclaim. 
Respectfully submitted: 
JED W. SHIELDS 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent 
Spencer Van Noy 
Received.__ _______ _ 
·copies of the foregoing brief 
this __ day of _______ , 1957. 
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